









The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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Both adverse selection and moral hazard models predict a positive relationship between 
risk and insurance; yet the most common finding in empirical studies of insurance is that 
of a negative correlation. In this paper we investigate the relationship between ex ante 
risk and private health insurance using data from the 2001 Australian National Health 
Survey (NHS). The Australian health system provides a setting where the relationship 
between risk and insurance is more transparent than many other institutional frameworks; 
private health insurance is not tied to employment; community rating limits the actions of 
insurers; and private coverage is high for a country providing free public hospital 
treatment. We find a strong positive association between self-assessed health and private 
health cover. We use the detailed information available in the NHS to investigate whether 
we can identify factors responsible for the negative correlation between risk (lower 
SAHS) and insurance cover. However this relationship persists despite the inclusion of a 
large set of controls for personal and socio-economic characteristics, risk-related 
behaviours, objective health measures and an index of mental health. The opposite effect 
of self-assessed health and long-term conditions on coverage suggests that SAHS is 
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Both adverse selection and moral hazard models predict that riskier individuals are more 
likely to be insured and purchase contracts with higher cover; yet the most common 
finding in empirical studies is that of a negative correlation between risk and insurance 
coverage (e.g. Cawley and Philipson [1], Chiappori et al [2], Chiappori and Salanie [3], 
Ettner [4], Monheit and Vistnes [5], Propper [6], and Shmueli [7]). Furthermore, the fact 
that this empirical result is found for different types of insurance (e.g. car, health, life) 
and in different countries (e.g. France, US, UK, Israel) suggests a fundamental 
relationship involving private information, consumer preferences and provider behaviour. 
The most common explanation for the counterintuitive result offered in recent papers is 
that of heterogeneity in risk aversion; the degree of risk aversion is negatively correlated 
with risk class [8].  
In this paper we provide information on the relationship between ex ante risk and private 
health insurance (PHI) in Australia. Several features make the PHI market in Australia 
particularly interesting in this context. There is universal access to a system of high-
quality public hospitals yet the PHI coverage for private hospital treatment is high (about 
45%); community rating excludes the tailoring of premiums to individual characteristics 
(except for age to a limited extent); and health insurance contracts are not tied to 
employment. We would expect the adverse selection effects to be stronger in the presence 
of a universal public insurance system such as the one in Australia [9]. Community rating 
implies that providers have limited opportunities to exclude or separate different risk 
types. Finally, since health insurance is not provided by or through employers, there is no 
selection into employment to consider in studying health insurance coverage. Hence, the 
demand for insurance in this market is simplified and the possibility of strategic 
behaviour by insurers is reduced. 
We look at the demand for private health insurance in Australia using the National Health 
Survey (NHS) 2001. The NHS is a large representative survey containing information on 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics including income, employment, and 
labour force status, health-related aspects of lifestyle and different measures of health 
(health status, long term medical conditions and recent injuries). The presence of a large 
number of controls on socio-economic factors and health related variables is important in 
isolating the role of risk. Previous studies of the Australian private health insurance 
include Cameron et al [10], Savage and Wright [11], Barrett and Conlon [12]and Ellis 
and Savage [13]. 
Several measures of health are considered in the analysis, but we focus mainly on the 
relationship between insurance purchase and self assessed health status (SAHS). SAHS is 
often used as a measure of risk on the grounds that it is a good predictor of mortality and 
morbidity (Idler and Benyamini [14], McCallum et al [15], Hurd and McGarry [16]) and 
more general continuous measures of health Gerdtham et al [17], Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer [18]). Since SAHS is arguably more likely to capture the social and mental 
aspects of well-being, it is also consistent with a broader notion of health than more 
objective measures such as the presence of long-term conditions. SAHS may also be 
more sensitive to variation over the whole distribution of health than objective measures 
such as serious long-term conditions.   
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Most previous studies of insurance look at the relationship between insurance and 
measures of ex post risk or utilisation and in that case the correlation between insurance 
and risk should capture both adverse selection and moral hazard effects. In our analysis, 
we include controls for the presence of detailed long term conditions and regard SAHS as 
capturing variations in health due to other factors such as frailty, senescence, psycho-
social effects, the incidence of early, or simply undiagnosed conditions [19]. Self 
assessed health is interpreted as ex ante risk (we address the issue of timing of the 
purchase of insurance below) and hence the relationship should reflect adverse selection 
but not moral hazard. 
Since insurers cannot base provision or features of the insurance contract on personal 
characteristics, the relationship between observed characteristics of the consumer and the 
decision to purchase insurance reflects consumer preferences rather than insurers’ 
reaction to adverse selection. In other words, we do not have to condition the analysis on 
observable (to the insurer) risk-related consumer characteristics as in Chiappori et al [2], 
and Finkelstein and McGarry [8]. There are two exceptions to this: there is a waiting 
period of one year for insurance claims by purchasers for pre-existing conditions, and 
reforms introduced in 2000 allowed insurers to base premiums on age in a limited and 
regulated fashion for new entrants. We include long-term conditions and age in the 
analysis to control for the possibility of selection by insurers on these characteristics.  We 
also estimate separate models for long-term and recent purchasers of insurance. 
We estimate a series of probit regressions with the purchase of insurance as the 
dependent variable. Without conditioning on any other factors, we find the not 
unexpected negative empirical relationship between risk (lower SAHS) and the 
probability of insurance. This relationship is strong, monotonic and significant. A change 
from poor to excellent SAHS increases the average probability of insurance by 27 
percentage points (ppts). After controlling for demographics, income and other socio-
economic variables, the relationship is reduced somewhat but remains monotonic and 
significant. Adding risk related behaviours (smoking, drinking, exercise and body mass 
index) also reduces but does not eliminate the relationship between risk and insurance. 
With all controls included, the relationship remains monotonic and significant but the 
difference in probabilities falls from 27 to 9 ppts. We conduct sensitivity analysis 
estimating models on different subsamples, including a mental health index, and 
conditioning on the time of purchase. The results remain robust.  
One of the interesting results is the different impact of long-term conditions on self-
assessed health and insurance: the presence of long-term conditions lowers SAHS and 
increases the probability of insurance coverage. In addition we find that risky behaviours 
are associated with less insurance and lower SAHS. This suggests that the relationship 
between SAHS and insurance cover is dominated by the correlation between SAHS and 
more general personality traits rather than ex ante health risk per se. In this sense our 
study supports the hypothesis that unobserved risk aversion is generating the empirical 
relationship between insurance and risk.  
The paper is organized as follows. A brief description of the institutional aspects of the 
private health insurance market in Australia is provided in the next section. This is 
followed by a discussion of the data. Section 4 discusses the models and section 5, the 
empirical results. Finally, concluding remarks are offered in section 6.  
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2) Institutional Framework  
All Australian residents are entitled to free public hospital treatment anywhere in the 
country. Public patients treated in public hospitals forego the choice of medical provider 
and are treated by specialists paid by the hospital. Patients covered by private insurance 
have access to private hospitals and private treatment in public hospitals. Private patients 
have choice over their medical provider and can face shorter waiting times for many 
procedures. Private health insurance can also be used to cover other procedures and items 
such as prostheses and devices provided to private in-patients, ancillary services which 
include dental care, allied health services and complementary care. Private inpatients are 
funded by a mix of private insurance, out-of-pocket payments and public subsidy to 
medical services. 
Insurers offer a menu of contracts and these include a waiting time for treatment of pre-
existing conditions. Insurance funds (with the exception of a few restricted membership 
funds) must accept all purchasers for each policy type offered. Until recently, premiums 
were community-rated and could not be tailored to particular individuals. Annual 
premiums vary depending upon the extent of cover, the front-end deductible and the state 
of residence. All increases in premiums must have government approval and applications 
for increases are considered once each year. There is also a reinsurance pool that 
redistributes between funds on the basis of the share of the insured population aged over 
65 and the number of long hospital stays. Although we would expect insurers to try to 
attract a favorable selection of clients with the packages they offer, competition for 
clients also means offering a broad range of services. Also, we expect the profit motive to 
be somewhat lessened in the Australian private health insurance market as currently over 
85% of the insurance companies are non-profit funds owned mutually by policy holders. 
Beginning in 1997 the government introduced a series of incentives to increase private 
health insurance coverage in order to take pressure off the public hospital system. The 
reforms were a reaction to the steadily declining membership level in private health 
insurance which had fallen to around 30% in the late 1990s. The reforms included a 30% 
subsidy to insurance premiums, a tax surcharge for the high-income uninsured and 
Lifetime Health Cover. The last policy regulated a premium increase of 2% for every 
year of age over 30 (up to a maximum of 70%) for those who joined after July 2000. The 
proportion of individuals covered by private insurance increased to about 45% in late 
2000. 
The strict regulation of premiums suggests limited scope for screening by insurers. 
However, screening is still possible through the package of treatments offered in the 
private sector. There is some evidence to support this conjecture. Private hospitals attract 
relatively low cost consumers and the length of stays for similar procedures is lower in 
private than public hospitals. [20, Supplementary Tables S8.1 and S8.2]. There is 
anecdotal evidence that patients with co-morbidities, who are expected to require more 
complex and longer-term care, are discouraged from admission to private hospitals 
despite insurance coverage. (These decisions are usually made by the physicians). 
Contracts between insurers and private hospitals can also specify maximum lengths of 
stay for particular procedures. Longer stays then become the financial responsibility of 
the private hospital and the patient. In such an environment individuals with longer 
expected hospital stays might not find existing insurance contracts attractive and choose  
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not to purchase cover. Also waiting times for pre-existing conditions might reduce the 
value of the private insurance contract for those consumers with previously diagnosed 
long-term conditions requiring treatment. 
3) Data 
The 2001 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) National Health Survey is a 
representative sample of 17,918 private dwellings across Australia. Within each 
household, information was gathered concerning one adult (age greater than 18) 
nominated by the household, all children aged 0 – 6 years, and one child aged 7 – 17 
years. Trained ABS interviewers conducted personal interviews with the nominated adult. 
A total of 26,862 confidentialised person records are included in the data set.  
The survey collected information on health status, long term medical conditions and 
recent injuries, use of health services and medications, health-related aspects of lifestyle 
(smoking, alcohol consumption, exercise and body mass index), demographic and socio-
economic characteristics including employment, income, and labour force status. From 
the initial sample of 26,862 individuals we delete observations corresponding to persons 
aged 18 or less, dependents, and those with missing information for SAHS. Since we 
study the purchase of health insurance, it is not appropriate to consider children and other 
dependents as independent observations. The remaining sample consists of 17,694 
observations.  
There is a considerable number of missing values for income, either personal or for the 
person’s income unit. (An income unit consists of a single adult or couple, with or 
without dependent children, living in the same dwelling.) Missing income data is not 
unusual for general household surveys not specifically designed to elicit information on 
income or wealth. In our analysis sample, 7% of the observations have missing values for 
personal income and 18% for income unit income. To avoid selection bias, we do not 
exclude these observations but rather include them in the analysis with the use of dummy 
variables. Specifically, two dummy variables take on the value of one for the 
observations with missing information on personal and other income respectively. For 
those observations, income values are set at the overall mean for the variable, hence the 
coefficients on the dummy variables measure shifts around the mean. Sensitivity checks 
are conducted on this issue. 
The question eliciting information on SAHS is formulated as follows: “In general, would 
you say that your health is Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair or Poor?” Only one 
category can be chosen. Table 1 presents sample proportions by SAHS categories. 
Almost 63% of the respondents place themselves in the good or very good categories. 
Only 5% consider themselves in poor health, however given the large sample size, this 
still amounts to over 900 observations.  
Table 1 also provides sample proportions by insurance cover. Private health insurance 
status indicates cover for private treatment in hospital. A small number of households 
have cover for ancillary services without hospital cover (less than 3% of our sample). 
Since we interpret the results in terms of access to private treatment in hospital, these 
individuals are classified as uninsured. Table 1 shows that just over 47% of the sample 
are insured. The raw data also show that insurance coverage increases with good health.  
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Of those who declare themselves in excellent health 54% are covered, while only 27% of 
those in poor health have insurance. The relationship is monotonic. In the following 
analysis, we are interested in whether this relationship can be reversed by adding controls 
for personal, economic and health-related characteristics.  
Table 1 near here 
 
 
4) Literature and Modeling Approach 
The basic model of demand for health insurance is the same as for other forms of 
insurance. Generally, health insurance is treated as a consumer good whose value lies in 
smoothing consumption across risky states. Adverse selection and moral hazard play an 
important role in the modeling of the demand for private health insurance. Adverse 
selection refers to the case where individuals differ according to their risk (of ill health) 
and when faced with the same menu of insurance options, riskier persons are more likely 
to purchase insurance or purchase higher coverage since the expected benefits are greater 
[21]. We expect individuals in worse health to be more likely to purchase insurance 
ceteris paribus since they have greater expected use of the health care sector and greater 
health-related expenditures.  
Simple models of self-selection support this intuition [3]. For example in models with 
two risk types, a separating equilibrium would show that insurance contracts taken up by 
low risk individuals have low premiums and high co-payments as opposed to the 
contracts chosen by high risk types, characterized by high premiums and low co-
payments. These models also predict the likelihood of incomplete markets in equilibrium 
since the low risk individuals may be driven out of the market. This is more likely in a 
system that has a universal public insurance system such as that in Australia. Low-risk 
types may prefer the public system to a private contract offering incomplete insurance 
[9].  
Moral hazard effects occur after the purchase of insurance and refer to the consumers’ 
change of behavior in such a way as to alter the distribution of probabilities across health 
states. Individuals who are insured have lower costs in the ill health states and take fewer 
precautions or invest less in preventative measures. This follows the general 
microeconomic treatment of moral hazard rather than the alternative definition found in 
Pauly [22] and frequently adopted in the health economics literature.  
We focus on the relationship between insurance purchase and self assessed health status, 
treating SAHS as an ex ante measure of risk. Adverse selection would predict a positive 
relationship between risk (lower SAHS) and probability of insurance cover. 
Variables measuring SAHS are usually interpreted as objective measures of health and 
are often treated simply as another personal characteristic. However some problems with 
the use of SAHS have emerged. Evidence of recalibration, or scale of reference bias, has 
been found in health economics studies Daltroy et al [19], Lindeboom and van Doorslaer 
[23]. This problem refers to individuals with the same level of true health reporting 
different SAHS on a simple scale because of differences in the interpretation of the 
thresholds and the categories of health levels. For example, individuals may increase their  
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self-assessed health with the length of time following the diagnosis of a serious condition. 
Also individuals may base their reports on very different comparison groups depending 
on their culture, peer group, education and income level. This makes the interpretation of 
the SAHS variable and its impacts problematic.  
A separate problem with the use of SAHS is the amount of measurement error it is likely 
to contain. Framing and the mode of the questionnaire have been found to be particularly 
important in determining individuals’ answers to this question. Studies on this aspect of 
SAHS are Crossley and Kennedy [24] and Clarke and Ryan [25] The results from the 
literature on recalibration and measurement errors are still too general to provide an 
unambiguous prediction of the likely bias caused by these problems in the context of our 
study, however the classical errors in variables theory would suggest that the effects of 
SAHS on the demand for insurance are likely to be attenuated. In other words, due to the 
problems inherent in the measurement of SAHS, we would expect the empirical 
relationship found between health risk and insurance to understate the true relationship.  
In most of the empirical literature, the relationship between risk and demand for 
insurance is found to be in the opposite direction to the predictions from adverse selection 
and moral hazard models. This is found in health care settings (health insurance in the 
US: Monheit and Vistnes [5] and Ettner [4]); health insurance in the UK: Propper [6]; 
health insurance in Israel: Schmueli [7]; long-term care in US: Finkelstein and McGarry 
[8]) and other insurance markets (life insurance: Cawley and Philipson [1]; and car 
insurance in France: Chiappori et al [2]). There are also examples where the expected 
positive correlation has been found (for example Finkelstein and Poterba [26] in the case 
of annuities). 
The presence of a counterintuitive negative relationship between health risk and 
insurance has been explained in two ways. First, the measure of risk (in our case SAHS) 
may capture individual heterogeneity not otherwise controlled for by explanatory 
variables. The second hypothesis is based on a model of screening: insurers have access 
to instruments (prices and more generally policy characteristics) that allow them to attract 
a favourable selection of clients [7]. In the case of health insurance, evidence for this type 
of behaviour has been found in the US by Ellis and McGuire [27].  
Our empirical strategy is similar to that used by Ettner [4] who investigates the presence 
of adverse selection in the utilization of health care as well as the purchase of private 
insurance. We begin with a simple model containing only SAHS dummy variables and 
attempt to eliminate the counterintuitive relationship between SAHS and insurance 
coverage by adding explanatory variables in order to control for observed sources of 
heterogeneity across individuals. To prevent or lessen the chance that omitted variables 
are driving the observed correlation between insurance and SAHS, we include a large 
number of controls in the demand for insurance. Furthermore, we believe that the 
inclusion of long term conditions, co-morbidities (the number of long-term conditions) 
and age should control for much of the possible selection by insurers since these are the 
likely (observable) characteristics also used by insurers to predict health care costs. For 
example, one would expect an older person with several long-term conditions to present a 
higher risk of needing long-term care when entering hospital for treatment.   
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Since our focus is on the SAHS coefficients, we are not concerned with multicollinearity 
between other explanatory variables. If the positive relationship between higher self-
assessed health and the probability insurance disappears because of the correlation with 
other controls, we will be able to say something about the source of the counterintuitive 
SAHS effects by considering the variable(s) responsible for eliminating the effect.  
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i I  is a continuous and latent variable measuring the net benefits of private health 
insurance, i I is the observed insurance coverage, i S denotes the vector of SAHS dummies, 
i X  is a vector of characteristics, β  and γ  are vectors of coefficients, i ε  measures 
unobserved factors which influence the demand for insurance and is assumed to be i.i.d. 
across households in our sample. We assume i ε  to be normally distributed and estimate 
the coefficients using probit regression.   
Before turning to the empirical results we consider the possible endogeneity of the SAHS 
variable in the demand for insurance. There is limited evidence of the effects of health 
insurance on health [28-30]. Nevertheless, the omitted variable rationale for the 
counterintuitive SAHS effect suggests that SAHS may be endogenous to the insurance 
decision.  
Ideally an instrument would be used to identify the causal effect of SAHS on insurance. 
Since accidents are usually unanticipated exogenous shocks that impact on health status, 
injury through accidents should constitute a valid instrument. However, questions on the 
incidence of accidents in the NHS 2001 referred to a short time period (the four weeks 
prior to the survey) and consequently very few individuals experienced this negative 
shock. We were unable to find another plausible instrument in the survey. Instead, to 
investigate the possibility of reverse causality between insurance and SAHS, we 
condition on the time of purchase of the insurance. Specifically, we estimate separate 
models for those consumers who are newly-insured (insured less than 5 years) and long-
term insured (insured 5 years or more). If insurance cover substantially impacts on self-
assessed health, we would expect to find a much stronger relationship for the long-term 
insured. 
A different method is used to highlight the relationship between the explanatory variables 
and SAHS on the one hand and the correlation between SAHS and insurance cover on the 
other. We adapt the procedure used to investigate the relationship between self-reported 
power and wealth in Lokshin and Ravallion [31]. Reduced form models for insurance and 
SAHS are estimated, each model including all explanatory variables except for SAHS. 
We then compare the estimated latent variables, the predicted linear indices, for SAHS 
and insurance purchase. Specifically, the insurance choice is modelled using a binary 
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and self-assessed health is modelled as an ordered probit regression: 
( ) ( )   Pr Pr            1       
*
j i i j i i i i k X k j S X S ≤ + < = = + ′ = − η π η π    (3) 
 
where i denotes the observation, j the category of SAHS with  j=1,…,5; π is a vector of 
coefficients; k is a vector of cut-off points for the index with k0 = -∞ and  k5 = ∞. η is 
assumed to be i.i.d. across households according to a normal distribution.   
We compute the correlation coefficients between the predicted δX and πX for the 
explanatory variables as a whole and for subsets of the X vector of variables. 
 
5) Results 
The NHS includes a large number of variables capturing variation in personal, household, 
and job-related characteristics as well as health-related variables. Table 2 lists the 
variables used in the analysis and their means and standard deviations by insurance 
status. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the NHS documentation [32]. 
The uninsured subset of the adult population are younger (25% aged less than 30), more 
likely to be single or sole parents (58% compared with 32% among the insured), less 
likely to live in major urban centres, have lower personal and other income, less educated 
and less likely to be employed, twice as likely to be a daily smoker and more likely to 
undertake no exercise.  
Table 2 near here 
We would expect strong relationships between both age and health and age and 
insurance. Other demographic variables such as sex, marital status, and presence of 
children have also been found to be correlated with SAHS and insurance purchase. In the 
analysis age is entered as a spline with break points at 30 and 65 to capture the impact of 
age-related insurance incentives. Marital status is interacted with a dummy variable for 
the presence of dependent children. 
Attitudes towards risk, specifically stronger risk aversion, should lead to a stronger 
demand for insurance. It may also lead individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles. We 
anticipate that SAHS may be positively correlated with the adoption of healthy lifestyles 
and therefore indirectly with risk avoidance. In our analysis, attitude towards risk is 
proxied by lifestyle variables directly related to health: smoking, drinking, exercise and 
body mass index categories. 
State governments have responsibility for the supply of public hospital care and regulate 
other aspects of health care provision. For this reason the supply and quality of services 
covered by private insurance are likely to vary by region and state. In addition, insurers 
are allowed to vary premiums by state. In general we would expect geographic location to 
be related to both SAHS and insurance. We include state indicators and rural/urban  
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dummies. The inclusion of these variables will also control for variations in wealth not 
picked up by income (such as property values). 
A strong correlation is often found between health and income and, more generally, 
health and wealth. Income is also a strong predictor of insurance status and insurance has 
been found to be a normal good for individuals with the same health status [30]. 
Improperly specified or measured income could result in a spurious positive relationship 
between insurance and SAHS. We use a general and flexible specification for income. 
Own and partner’s incomes are entered in a quadratic form interacted with the sex of the 
respondent. Break points in income are also used to allow for the impact of a tax 
surcharge on the high-income uninsured. A dummy variable for entitlement to a 
concession card or Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA) pension is included to control 
for the availability of subsidised health care for specific low income groups. Personal and 
other household incomes are also entered separately. We use the size of the home 
(number of persons in the household per number of bedrooms in the home) to proxy 
wealth over and above income.  
We include a variety of variables to capture heterogeneity in education, employment and 
labour force status. These include occupation dummies, hours of work, including a long 
hours dummy and a shift work dummy, and dummies representing shifts in the effects of 
unemployment duration for those who are unemployed. Labour force status variables and 
some of the hours of work variables are interacted with the sex of the respondent. These 
variables measure aspects of the socio-economic status of the household not captured 
directly by the income variables. 
We include variables indicating the presence of long-term conditions as objective 
measures of health and to investigate the possibility of screening by insurers. In one 
specification we include the number of long-term conditions and indicators for four 
broadly-defined and commonly found conditions: asthma, cancer, heart condition, and 
diabetes. In our most general specification, we include indicators for 46 detailed chronic 
conditions. The specific grouping used for the detailed conditions is based on work 
conducted by Randall Ellis on US data in predicting the costing of procedures.  
Table 3 near here 
Table 3 presents coefficients on the SAHS dummies for various specifications of the 
insurance probit. Detailed results are presented in Appendix Table A1. Each column of 
results in Table 3 represents a separate probit. Model I includes only the SAHS dummies; 
five parameters are estimated including the intercept. We find a monotonic relationship 
between self-assessed health and the probability of insurance coverage consistent with the 
evidence found in the raw data. Individuals with the lowest health status are less likely to 
be covered by private insurance. All health categories, except very good, are significantly 
different from the omitted group (excellent).  
In Model II a set of 20 demographic variables are added to the probit. These variables 
include information on age, household composition, sex, country of birth, marital status 
and language spoken at home. There is very little effect on the relationship between 
SAHS and insurance. In Model III we add 25 variables representing household income, 
wealth and geographic location. The pseudo R2 increases dramatically from 8% in Model  
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II to 20% after inclusion of these controls. We find that about one half of the correlation 
between SAHS and the insurance index was in fact picking up variation in income and 
location. Nevertheless the remaining positive relationship between health and insurance is 
strong and significant. 
In Model IV, 24 additional socio-economic variables are included, representing variation 
in education, employment, hours of work, occupation, labour force status and duration of 
unemployment. There is a further slight reduction in the correlation between SAHS and 
the latent insurance index. Model V includes the risk-related behaviours (smoking, 
drinking and exercise) and weight. This has a slightly stronger impact in reducing the 
relationship between SAHS and insurance.  
Finally in the last two sets of results we add the objective health measures defined by the 
presence of long-term conditions, broadly defined in Model VI and in detail in Model 
VII. In the presence of screening, we would expect these variables to explain the positive 
correlation between SAHS and insurance. In fact, including these variables increases the 
strength of the relationship. We discuss this further below.  
Despite the use of a large number of controls for personal, socio-economic and health-
related characteristics, the negative correlation between risk and insurance coverage 
remains strong and significant.  
Table 4 near here 
In order to better understand the size of the relationship, we compute the marginal effects 
of SAHS on the probability of purchasing private insurance. Table 4 presents the average 
predicted probability of insurance using observed SAHS and the average predicted 
probabilities obtained by placing all observations in turn in each of the SAHS categories 
with all other controls at their observed value. The marginal effect is then equal to the 
difference between the predicted probability for excellent health and that for each of the 
other SAHS categories. The predicted probabilities are computed based on the 
coefficients of the two extreme models in Table 3: Model I with only SAHS dummies 
and Model VII with the maximum number of explanatory variables. When only SAHS 
dummies are included, the differences in predicted probability of cover across SAHS 
categories are very large. There is a drop of 27 percentage points between the probability 
of cover for those in excellent health and those in poor health. After the inclusion of all 
125 control variables, the fall in probability of cover is lower but still considerable at over 
9 ppts. 
In order to investigate the factors driving the correlation between SAHS and insurance 
cover, and following the procedure developed in Lokshin and Ravallion [31], we 
compute the correlation coefficients between the predicted δX and πX in equations (2) 
and (3) above for all explanatory variables and for subsets of the X vector of variables. 
Table 5 presents the correlation coefficients for the broad groups of variables described in 
Tables 2 and A1. Including all 125 variables yields a correlation coefficient of 36.6%. 
This can be interpreted as the percent correlation between the predicted net benefit of 
insurance cover and the predicted underlying continuous health level.  
Table 5 near here  
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When including only the demographic variables in the correlation, the coefficient is 
slightly lower but still strongly positive. This is surprising as we would expect age to 
reduce health and increase insurance purchase. A closer look at the coefficients (detailed 
results are available from the authors) shows differences in the effects of age and other 
demographic characteristics. While the effect of age on insurance cover is concave with a 
peak at 65, the relationship between age and self-assessed health is more or less 
monotonic and negative except for a positive jump at 65. The effects of marital status and 
the presence of children are in similar directions and contribute to the positive 
correlation. Geographical variables have mixed effects. Those living in more rural areas 
are in better health and are less likely to purchase private insurance.  
Table 5 shows the strong positive effect of income on both the probability of having 
insurance cover and higher health status. The correlation coefficient is 91%. Higher 
education increases both insurance and health. The employment variables have mixed 
effects but they tend to be in the same direction. More professional occupations increase 
both indices of health and insurance benefits. Being out of the labour force or 
unemployed reduces both indices but the effect is much less for females.  
The health-related lifestyle variables (smoking, drinking, lack of exercise, and body mass 
index) reduce both health and insurance indices giving an overall positive correlation. 
Smoking is the major driver of this result, being strongly negatively associated with 
insurance and better health. The results involving risk related variables are consistent 
with the underlying hypothesis of heterogeneous risk aversion; more risk averse 
individuals are more likely to buy insurance and to be in better health.  
The most surprising result concerns long-term conditions, our objective measure of 
health. The correlation on the effects on self-assessed health and insurance is negative 
and significant at 24%. The effects of the individual coefficients are mixed but in most 
cases, the presence of a long-term condition reduces health status and increases the 
probability of buying insurance. If there is screening on the part of insurers, this result 
indicates that it is not strong enough to reverse the relationship between overall self-
assessed health and insurance cover.  
Table 6 near here 
Finally, we undertake a number of sensitivity checks. In Table 6 we present the marginal 
effects of SAHS using excellent as the base category. (Detailed results of the regressions 
are available from the authors.) Since SAHS may capture mental, as well as physical, 
aspects of health we include an index of mental well-being, the Kessler score. This is a 
measure of psychological distress derived from 10 questions about negative emotional 
states experienced in the four weeks prior to interview. The marginal effect of poor health 
is reduced from 9% (in Model VII) to 8% but the relationship remains significant. As a 
check on the influence of measurement error in the income variables when including 
missing incomes, we re-estimate the model including only observations with no missing 
income. Again the gradient is significant and slightly smaller than in Model VII.  
The model is re-estimated on sub-samples of the data to allow for more general impacts 
of the variables. The results indicate that families and females have a stronger positive  
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association between health status and insurance than singles and males, but all sub-
samples exhibit a similar relationship.    
The last two columns of Table 6 present separate insurance probits depending on the time 
of purchase. The model ‘Insured 5+ years’ is estimated on the whole sample treating 
those insured less than 5 years as uninsured. The model ‘Insured <5 years’ is estimated 
excluding those who had been insured at least 5 years at the time of the survey. Reverse 
causality should generate a stronger relationship for the long-term insured. We do find a 
slightly stronger relationship for the longer-term insured however, a significant 
correlation persists for the newly insured.   
A different reason for considering the newly insured separately is the implementation of 
reforms introduced between 1997 and 2000. Allowing all the coefficients to vary for the 
two groups, we find that the relationship between insurance and health status remains 
positive and significant.  
 
6) Conclusions and Extensions 
In this paper, we find a strong positive association between self-assessed health and 
private health cover in Australia. Our result goes against the predictions of adverse 
selection but is consistent with most other empirical findings in the literature on 
insurance. This relationship persists despite the use of a large set of controls for personal 
and socio-economic characteristics, risk-related behaviours, and objective health 
measures. A popular interpretation for this result is that of screening by the insurers. 
However our results do not support this hypothesis because we also find that the effect of 
long-term conditions is consistent with adverse selection; the presence of long-term 
conditions increases the probability of cover while reducing self-assessed health. If there 
is screening based on observables such as long-term conditions, it is not strong enough to 
explain the positive relationship between self-reported health and insurance.  
The comparison of the effects of long-term conditions and SAHS on the probability of 
purchasing insurance is interesting for another reason. One could argue that SAHS 
incorporates more variation across personality types compared to a purely objective 
health measure. The finding of a negative relationship between SAHS and insurance 
cover over and above the positive correlation involving long-term conditions supports the 
hypothesis that the commonly found and counterintuitive result is driven by heterogeneity 
in personality traits including the level of risk aversion. For example Ettner [4] surmises 
that the positive relationship found between SAHS and insurance in the US could be 
measuring a positive attitude to the medical profession and the health care system. 
Individuals with this attitude could have a more positive attitude overall (and have a 
higher SAHS). Nevertheless, the finding of a counterintuitive risk-insurance relationship 
in data involving other types of insurance (e.g. car insurance) suggests that the 
personality trait responsible for the empirical finding may be more closely tied to 
attitudes toward risk.    
Panel data would be useful in controlling for unobserved and fixed individual-specific 
effects. However the effects of attitudes towards risk may be more complex than the 
usual specification of fixed effects would allow. The use of preference models under  
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uncertainty with more emphasis on the specification of the utility associated with health 
states and the interaction with insurance would be useful in clarifying the interpretations 
of the empirical results. Of course, the availability of more direct measures of attitudes 
towards risk in survey data would also help in identifying the source of the empirical 
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Table 1 Sample proportions in SAHS categories by insurance category 
  Self Assessed Health Status   
  Excellent Very  Good  Good  Fair  Poor  All 
Number 3037  5627  5502  2600  928  17694 
Percentage 17.2  31.8  31.1  14.7  5.2  100 
Number insured  1646  2952  2515  966  249  8328 
Number not insured  1391  2675  2987  1634  679  9366 
Percentage  by SAHS            
   Insured  54.2  52.5  45.7  37.2  26.8  47.1 
   Not insured  45.8  47.5  54.3  62.9  73.2  52.9 
 
  
Table 2 Variable means by insurance status 
  Not insured  Insured      Not insured  Insured 
Demographics  Mean StDev Mean StDev    Education Mean  StDev  Mean  StDev 
male  0.458 0.498 0.452 0.498    degree* 0.094  0.292  0.240  0.427 
female  0.542 0.498 0.548 0.498    diploma 0.075  0.263  0.117  0.322 
age in years  45.819  18.179  47.792  15.249    other qualification  0.249  0.432  0.241  0.428 
age>30  dummy  0.746 0.435 0.875 0.330   only  school  0.550  0.497  0.381  0.486 
age minus 30 if >0  17.137  16.640  18.342  14.443   missing  qualifications 0.032  0.176  0.020  0.141 
age>65  dummy  0.194 0.395 0.152 0.359    Employment      
age minus 65 if >0  1.797  4.211  1.317  3.614  manager*  0.027 0.163 0.082 0.274 
single*  0.347 0.476 0.245 0.430    professional 0.072  0.259  0.198  0.398 
married  0.466 0.499 0.671 0.470    assoc  professional 0.052  0.222  0.102  0.302 
married with kids  0.436  0.928  0.617 1.021    trade  0.079 0.269 0.064 0.245 
single with kids  0.229  0.674  0.070  0.362   advanced  clerk  0.020  0.141  0.038  0.190 
born in Australia*  0.710  0.454  0.753  0.431   intermed  clerk  0.090  0.286  0.117  0.322 
born  NZ  0.027 0.163 0.017 0.131    intermed production  0.055  0.228  0.035  0.185 
born  Oceania  0.007 0.083 0.004 0.062    elementary clerk  0.049  0.217  0.036  0.187 
born  UK  0.088 0.283 0.085 0.279    labourer 0.065  0.247  0.031  0.173 
born NW Europe  0.023  0.151  0.021  0.145  employee*  0.413  0.492  0.537  0.499 
born SE Europe  0.061  0.240  0.043  0.203  employer  0.011  0.106  0.048  0.214 
born N Africa  0.003  0.057  0.003  0.056    self employed  0.083  0.276  0.114  0.318 
born Middle East  0.011  0.102 0.004 0.067    full-time  worker*  0.352 0.478 0.525 0.499 
born other Africa  0.008  0.090  0.010  0.099  part-time  0.158  0.365  0.178  0.382 
born  SE Asia  0.029  0.169  0.023  0.149    part-time and female  0.114  0.318  0.148  0.356 
born other Asia  0.009  0.096  0.011  0.104   shift  work  0.093  0.291  0.096  0.295 
english at home*  0.856   0.351    0.892  0.310     works over 48 hrs/wk  0.090  0.286  0.187  0.390 
non  english  0.144 0.351 0.108 0.310    Labour Force             
Geographic                employed*  0.510  0.500  0.703  0.457 
NSW*  0.223 0.416 0.217 0.412    not  in labour force  0.441  0.497  0.282  0.450 
VIC  0.208 0.406 0.206 0.404    fem  &  not in lf  0.288  0.453  0.196  0.397 
QLD  0.187 0.390 0.162 0.369    unemployed 0.049  0.216  0.015  0.120 
SA  0.119 0.324 0.114 0.318    female & unemp  0.022  0.147  0.007  0.082 
WA  0.115 0.319 0.133 0.340    unempl  for 13-51 wks  0.014  0.117  0.005  0.072 
TAS  0.067 0.251 0.062 0.242    unempl  for >51 wks  0.007  0.083  0.001  0.031 
NT  0.015 0.122 0.014 0.119    Risk Behaviours             
ACT  0.065 0.246 0.091 0.287    daily smoker  0.328  0.470  0.164  0.370 
major  urban*  0.611 0.488 0.683 0.465    no. st. drinks per day  1.177  2.754  1.177  1.922 
other  urban  0.270 0.444 0.197 0.398  thin  0.088  0.283  0.066  0.249 
rural  0.119 0.324 0.119 0.324    normal* 0.370  0.483  0.388  0.487 
Income ('000's)         overweight  0.287  0.453  0.328  0.470 
Personal income         obese  0.153  0.360  0.148  0.355 
if  female  0.191 0.249 0.292 0.416    missing bmi dummy  0.103  0.303  0.070  0.255 
if  male  0.236 0.360 0.402 0.618    low exercise*  0.362  0.481  0.409  0.492 
squared if female  0.099  0.268  0.258 0.753    high  0.054 0.226 0.063 0.243 
squared if male  0.185  0.520  0.544  1.397  moderate  0.233  0.423  0.265  0.441 
Other income         sedentary  0.009  0.096  0.010  0.098 
if  female  0.132 0.272 0.279 0.493    no exercise  0.342  0.474  0.254  0.435 
if  male  0.088 0.193 0.146 0.295    Chronic Conditions             
squared if female  0.092 0.366 0.321 0.996    number 2.785  1.750  2.848  1.665 
squared if male  0.045  0.211  0.108  0.397    asthma 0.115  0.320  0.102  0.303 
missing  personal  0.049 0.216 0.097 0.296  cancer  0.099  0.299  0.105  0.306 
missing  other  0.178 0.382 0.184 0.388    heart 0.382  0.486  0.411  0.492 
person/bedroom  0.886 0.426 0.852 0.386    diabetes 0.085  0.279  0.065  0.246 
levy  if  male  0.015 0.122 0.113 0.317    46 conditions  see table A1    
levy  if  female  0.023 0.150 0.065 0.247          
concession  card  0.533 0.499 0.228 0.420     
dva  pension  0.024 0.154 0.009 0.096    *  indicates omitted group in regressions. 
dva widow pension  0.033  0.179  0.008  0.087      
Table 3 Private health insurance probits – various specifications 
Coefficients on the SAHS categories (excellent is the omitted group) 
SAHS  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Category  Coeff.  p-value Coeff.  p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff.  p-value 
                                      
very  good  -0.0437  0.1221 -0.0569  0.0509 -0.0152 0.6231  0.0022 0.9437 0.0232 0.4641 -0.0003 0.9914 -0.0004  0.991 
good -0.2132  <.0001  -0.2288  <.0001  -0.1081  0.0006  -0.0712 0.0252 -0.0258  0.4284 -0.0707 0.0357 -0.0696  0.0381 
fair   -0.4332  <.0001  -0.4654  <.0001  -0.2035  <.0001  -0.1568 <.0001 -0.0933  0.0189 -0.1644 <.0001 -0.1598  0.0002 
poor   -0.7233  <.0001  -0.7549  <.0001  -0.3558  <.0001  -0.3149 <.0001 -0.2404 <.0001 -0.3261 <.0001 -0.3065  <.0001 
Log 
Likelihood  -12036.42 -11253.44 -9785.54  -9585.18 -9459.29 -9440.69 -9397.79 
No. Pars.  5  25  50  74  84  89  130 
Pseudo-R
2 0.0162  0.0802  0.2001  0.2165  0.2268  0.2283  0.2318 
                                     
Added  Vars    None  Demographic  Demographic Demographic Demographic  Demographic Demographic 
             Geographic  Geographic Geographic  Geographic Geographic 
             Income  Income  Income  Income  Income 
                  Education  Education  Education  Education 
                  Labour Force  Labour Force  Labour Force  Labour Force 
                  Employment  Employment  Employment  Employment 
                       Risk Behaviour  Risk Behaviour  Risk Behaviour 
                Conditions-Broad  Conditions-Details 
                               
Notes:  The dependent variable is dichotomous with a 1 indicating private hospital cover. Each set of coefficients corresponds to a separate probit regression. The 
number of observations for each probit is 17,694. No Parameters indicates the number of parameters estimated in the probit including an intercept. The coefficients on 





Table 4 Private health insurance probits 
Marginal effects of the SAHS categories – Models I and VII 
   Model I  Model VII 
   Estimate StErr Estimate StErr 
Average Predicted Probability - Observed SAHS  0.4707   0.0037  0.4705   0.0036 
(observed probability is 0.471)              
              
Average Predicted Probability - Counterfactual 
SAHS              
  excellent  0.5420 0.0092 0.4889 0.0085 
 very good  0.5246  0.0073  0.4888  0.0059 
  good  0.4571 0.0066 0.4677 0.0060 
 fair   0.3715  0.0100  0.4404  0.0091 
 poor   0.2683  0.0143  0.3967  0.0158 
              
Marginal Effects - Comparison Group is Excellent             
 very good  -0.0174  0.0125  -0.0001  0.0095 
  good  -0.0849 0.0107 -0.0212 0.0105 
 fair   -0.1704  0.0130  -0.0485  0.0127 
 poor   -0.2737  0.0185  -0.0922  0.0192 
              
Notes: The average predicted probability is computed with all explanatory variables (including SAHS) 
at their observed values. A predicted probability of coverage is computed at each data point using the 
model estimates and averaged over the sample. The predicted probabilities with counterfactual SAHS 
are computed by placing each observation in the SAHS category under consideration while keeping all 
other variables at their observed values. A predicted probability of coverage is computed for each data 
point and these are averaged over the sample. The marginal effect is simply the difference in the 
predicted probability with all sample points placed in the category under consideration and the predicted 















All variables  mixed  mixed  0.3662  <.0001 
Demographics mixed  mixed  0.3454  <.0001 
Geography mixed  mixed  -0.5230  <.0001 
Income positive  positive  0.9100  <.0001 
Education positive  positive  0.7829  <.0001 
Employment positive  positive  0.5106  <.0001 
Risk behaviours  negative   negative   0.6604  <.0001 
Conditions negative    positive  -0.2442  <.0001 
       
 Notes: The correlation is calculated using the components of the linear indices in the ordered probit 
regression for self-assessed health and the binary probit for insurance. See the text for details.    
 
Table 6 Marginal Effects - Percentage Point Change from Excellent Group 















very good  0.01   0.00   -0.01   0.00   -0.01   0.00   -0.01   0.00   -0.01  
good  0.02**  0.02*  0.01   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.01   0.02** 
fair  0.05***  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  0.05**  0.06*** 0.03*  0.04***  0.03* 
poor  0.09***  0.08*** 0.08*** 0.11***  0.07***  0.11*** 0.07***  0.07***  0.05*** 
                                                  
No.  pars.  130 131 128 130 127 122 122 130 130 
No.  obs.  17,694 17,694 14,497 11,003  6,691  9,640  8,054  17,694 11,829 
Log 
Likelihood  -9397.79 -9396.43 -7648.69 -5736.38 -3510.82 -5066.76 -4267.49 -9138.39 -5054.50 
Notes: * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The other controls are as described for Model VII except for 
obvious exclusions/inclusions related to the change in specification. The long-term insurance probit is estimated on the whole sample treating the insured 
less than 5 years as not insured. The short-term insurance probit is estimated on the reduced sample that excludes those who were insured 5 years ago or 
more.  
 
Appendix Table A1 Insurance probits – Various specifications, Details 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Variable Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value Coeff p-value  Coeff  p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
Intercept  0.1054 <.0001 -0.9214 <.0001 -0.251  0.180  0.5361 0.0094 0.5824 0.0055 0.5661  0.0071 0.5402 0.0104 
verygood -0.0437  0.1221  -0.0569  0.0509  -0.015  0.623  0.0022  0.9437  0.0232  0.4641  -0.0003  0.9914  -0.0004  0.9910 
good -0.2132  <.0001  -0.2288  <.0001  -0.108 0.001 -0.0712  0.0252  -0.0258  0.4284  -0.0707  0.0357  -0.0696  0.0381 
fair -0.4332  <.0001  -0.4654  <.0001  -0.204 <.0001 -0.1568 <.0001  -0.0933  0.0189 -0.1644 <.0001 -0.1598 0.0002 
poor -0.7233  <.0001  -0.7549  <.0001  -0.356 <.0001 -0.3149 <.0001  -0.2404  <.0001 -0.3261 <.0001 -0.3065 <.0001 
female        0.0734  0.0002  0.059  0.249  -0.1291  0.1491  -0.1543  0.0878  -0.1694  0.0612  -0.1707  0.0604 
AGE        0.0181  0.0053  -0.022  0.002  -0.0324  <.0001 -0.0306 <.0001 -0.0323 <.0001 -0.0321 <.0001 
agegt30        0.4482  <.0001  0.336  <.0001  0.3802  <.0001 0.4087 <.0001 0.4164  <.0001 0.4248 <.0001 
ageless30        -0.0133  0.0457  0.047  <.0001  0.0574  <.0001 0.0532 <.0001 0.0527  <.0001 0.0505 <.0001 
agegt65        -0.2716  <.0001  0.097  0.112  0.1002  0.1035  0.0718  0.2464  0.0840  0.1759  0.0849  0.1754 
ageless65        -0.0116  0.0240  -0.027  <.0001  -0.0263  <.0001 -0.0238 <.0001 -0.0225 <.0001 -0.0197 0.0007 
married        0.3862  <.0001  0.274  <.0001  0.2787  <.0001 0.2535 <.0001 0.2534  <.0001 0.2582 <.0001 
mwithkids        -0.0453  0.0003  0.074  <.0001  0.0624  0.0002  0.0597  0.0005  0.0636  0.0002  0.0644  0.0002 
swithkids        -0.2794  <.0001  -0.028  0.273  -0.0273  0.2990  -0.0240  0.3661  -0.0215  0.4187  -0.0182  0.4941 
bornnz        -0.4076  <.0001  -0.464  <.0001  -0.4363  <.0001 -0.4403 <.0001 -0.4389 <.0001 -0.4451 <.0001 
bornoceania        -0.4281  0.0019  -0.452  0.002  -0.3812  0.0103  -0.3760  0.0118  -0.3620  0.0152  -0.3603  0.0158 
bornuk        -0.1832  <.0001  -0.265  <.0001  -0.2803  <.0001 -0.2778 <.0001 -0.2737 <.0001 -0.2721 <.0001 
bornnweurope        -0.1985  0.0033  -0.237  0.001  -0.2585  0.0003  -0.2362  0.0011  -0.2338  0.0013  -0.2351  0.0012 
bornseeurope        -0.2591  <.0001  -0.290  <.0001  -0.2434 <.0001 -0.2416 <.0001  -0.2316 <.0001 -0.2321 <.0001 
bornnafrica        0.0146  0.9335  0.102  0.588  0.0555  0.7709  0.0501  0.7943  0.0591  0.7591  0.0507  0.7940 
bornmiddleeas        -0.5266  <.0001  -0.399 0.002 -0.3728  0.0045 -0.3465 0.0085 -0.3296  0.0123 -0.3363 0.0109 
bornoafrica        0.0281  0.7876  -0.149  0.194  -0.2417  0.0383  -0.2926  0.0121  -0.2828  0.0156  -0.2841  0.0157 
bornseasia        -0.1926  0.0037  -0.195  0.006  -0.2023  0.0046  -0.2283  0.0015  -0.2213  0.0021  -0.2345  0.0011 
bornoasia        -0.0352  0.7207  -0.071  0.496  -0.1343  0.2035  -0.1341  0.2036  -0.1150  0.2764  -0.1012  0.3400 
nonenglish        -0.0926  0.0165  -0.048  0.248  -0.0670  0.1089  -0.0819  0.0522  -0.0664  0.1167  -0.0654  0.1230 
VIC              0.032  0.321  0.0320  0.3226  0.0210  0.5187  0.0200  0.5405  0.0258  0.4307 
QLD              0.003  0.933  0.0076  0.8249  -0.0029  0.9339  -0.0077  0.8240  -0.0059  0.8635 
SA              0.101  0.008  0.1240  0.0012  0.1238  0.0014  0.1220  0.0016  0.1220  0.0017 
WA              0.169  <.0001  0.1771  <.0001  0.1664  <.0001  0.1638  <.0001  0.1664  <.0001 
TAS              0.200  <.0001  0.2146  <.0001  0.2103  <.0001  0.2053  <.0001  0.2054  <.0001 
NT              0.037  0.683  0.0350  0.6990  0.0473  0.6051  0.0503  0.5828  0.0481  0.6008 
ACT              -0.025  0.570  -0.0799  0.0767  -0.0827  0.0689  -0.0931  0.0412  -0.0868  0.0578 
                    
  
 
Appendix Table A1 Insurance probits – Various specifications, details continued 
      Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Variable         Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value Coeff p-value Coeff  p-value Coeff p-value 
otherurban              -0.234  <.0001  -0.2056  <.0001 -0.1991 <.0001 -0.1972 <.0001 -0.1975 <.0001 
rural           -0.146  <.0001  -0.1555  <.0001  -0.1500 <.0001 -0.1465 <.0001 -0.1487 <.0001 
incfemk           1.037  <.0001  0.9304  <.0001  0.9593  <.0001  0.9547  <.0001  0.9469  <.0001 
incmalk           0.642  <.0001  0.5378  <.0001  0.5167  <.0001  0.5165  <.0001  0.5083  <.0001 
incfemksqu           -0.098  0.090  -0.0795  0.1966  -0.0912  0.1401  -0.0921  0.1345  -0.0908  0.1409 
incmalksqu           0.005  0.883  -0.0048  0.9059  0.0018  0.9640  0.0015  0.9715  0.0037  0.9287 
incothf           0.377  <.0001  0.3673  <.0001  0.3502  <.0001  0.3567  <.0001  0.3543  <.0001 
incothm           0.439  <.0001  0.3483  0.0008  0.3495  0.0008  0.3413  0.0011  0.3366  0.0013 
incothfsqu          0.111  0.014  0.1096  0.0171  0.1117  0.0152  0.1070  0.0199  0.1078  0.0186 
incothmsqu           0.005  0.946  0.0333  0.6446  0.0311  0.6695  0.0330  0.6509  0.0338  0.6410 
misspinc           0.283  <.0001  0.2508  <.0001  0.2441  <.0001  0.2523  <.0001  0.2487  <.0001 
missothinc           0.007  0.850  0.0189  0.6099  0.0401  0.2827  0.0356  0.3403  0.0376  0.3154 
persperbed           -0.275  <.0001  -0.2621  <.0001 -0.2573 <.0001 -0.2537  <.0001 -0.2555 <.0001 
mwithlevy           -0.041  0.578  -0.1058  0.1543  -0.1061  0.1554  -0.1015  0.1743  -0.1070  0.1526 
swithlevy        0.186  0.003  0.0989  0.1252  0.1060  0.1023  0.1137  0.0801  0.1130  0.0826 
concard           -0.694  <.0001  -0.6741  <.0001  -0.6620 <.0001 -0.6710 <.0001 -0.6692 <.0001 
dvapen           -0.402  <.0001  -0.3918  <.0001  -0.3979 <.0001 -0.4076 <.0001 -0.4107 <.0001 
dvawid           -0.662  <.0001  -0.6611  <.0001  -0.6891 <.0001 -0.6984 <.0001 -0.7128 <.0001 
diploma                 -0.1228  0.0066  -0.0988  0.0299  -0.0967  0.0339  -0.0928  0.0423 
otherqual                 -0.2340  <.0001  -0.1969 <.0001 -0.1972 <.0001 -0.1887 <.0001 
onlyschool                 -0.3418  <.0001  -0.2889 <.0001 -0.2827 <.0001 -0.2762 <.0001 
missqual                 -0.3601  <.0001  -0.3105 <.0001 -0.3172 <.0001 -0.3151 <.0001 
professional                 -0.1099  0.0698  -0.1118  0.0668  -0.1105  0.0704  -0.1048  0.0872 
assprof                 -0.0701  0.2666  -0.0590  0.3528  -0.0520  0.4135  -0.0567  0.3730 
trade                 -0.3537  <.0001  -0.3154 <.0001 -0.3062 <.0001 -0.3041 <.0001 
advclerk                 -0.1220  0.1383  -0.1160  0.1614  -0.1123  0.1758  -0.1154  0.1650 
intclerk                 -0.0975  0.1228  -0.0770  0.2259  -0.0690  0.2788  -0.0668  0.2954 
intprod                 -0.5452  <.0001  -0.4884 <.0001 -0.4772 <.0001 -0.4738 <.0001 
elclerk                 -0.2612  0.0004  -0.2361  0.0016  -0.2305  0.0021  -0.2347  0.0018 






Appendix Table A1 Insurance probits – Various specifications, details continued 
        Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Variable             Coeff  p-value  Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value 
employPT                    -0.0671  0.2941  -0.0944  0.1420  -0.0935  0.1466  -0.1001  0.1205 
notinLF               -0.2977  <.0001  -0.2856  0.0002  -0.2850  0.0002  -0.2716  0.0004 
unemp               -0.1927  0.1211  -0.1668  0.1851  -0.1613  0.2005  -0.1587  0.2089 
femployPT               0.2514  0.0010  0.2655  0.0006  0.2644  0.0006  0.2669  0.0005 
fnotinLF               0.2011  0.0033  0.2058  0.0028  0.2128  0.0021  0.1926  0.0057 
funemp               0.0238  0.8689  0.0276  0.8497  0.0248  0.8652  0.0269  0.8544 
unemp13t51               0.2099  0.1371  0.2162  0.1316  0.2175  0.1294  0.2143  0.1363 
unempgt51               -0.2330  0.2839  -0.2261  0.3041  -0.2096  0.3403  -0.2035  0.3563 
employer            0.3050  <.0001  0.3183  <.0001  0.3265  <.0001  0.3251  <.0001 
selfemp               -0.0212  0.6028  -0.0165  0.6873  -0.0142  0.7280  -0.0146  0.7223 
shift               -0.0708  0.0586  -0.0627  0.0965  -0.0632  0.0943  -0.0560  0.1390 
over48h               0.0907  0.0158  0.1097  0.0037  0.1109  0.0034  0.1145  0.0025 
smoke                     -0.3620  <.0001  -0.3580  <.0001  -0.3470  <.0001 
drinks                     -0.0063  0.2265  -0.0065  0.2134  -0.0049  0.3569 
thin                     -0.0161  0.7069  -0.0122  0.7757  -0.0135  0.7534 
fat1                     -0.0037  0.8867  -0.0069  0.7913  -0.0089  0.7350 
veryfat                     -0.0004  0.9902  -0.0065  0.8448  -0.0190  0.5727 
missbmi                     -0.1438  0.0004  -0.1371  0.0008  -0.1366  0.0009 
exhigh                     0.0197  0.6847  0.0173  0.7212  0.0204  0.6759 
exmod                     -0.0049  0.8602  -0.0039  0.8877  -0.0021  0.9401 
exsed                     -0.0325  0.7650  -0.0448  0.6808  -0.0462  0.6720 
exno                     -0.1188  <.0001  -0.1161  <.0001  -0.1131  <.0001 
numltc                           0.0466  <.0001       
asthma                           -0.0050  0.8905       
cancer                           0.0301  0.4050       
heart                           -0.0040  0.8755       







Appendix Table A1 Insurance probits – Various specifications, details continued 
             Model  VII 
Variable                 Coeff  p-value 
Other Infectious Diseases                                 0.1135  0.2680 
Breast, Prostate, Colorectal and Other Cancers and Tumors                   0.0875  0.5602 
Other  Neoplasms                  0.0650  0.4188 
Diabetes with No or  Unspecified  Complications               -0.1020  0.0978 
Type I Diabetes Mellitus                         0.1192  0.3861 
Other  Endocrine/Metabolic/Nutritional  Disorders               0.0100  0.8062 
Peptic Ulcer, Hemorrhage, Other Specified Gastrointestinal Disorders                 0.1103  0.0587 
Other  Gastrointestinal  Disorders                0.0240  0.5588 
Rheumatoid Arthritis and Inflammatory Connective Tissue Disease                 -0.0856  0.1458 
Disorders of the Vertebrae and Spinal Discs               -0.0218  0.8721 
Osteoporosis and Other Bone/Cartilage Disorders                     0.1295  0.0311 
Other Musculoskeletal and Connective Tissue Disorders                   0.0427  0.0650 
Disorders  of  Immunity                 0.1160  0.5588 
Iron Deficiency and Other/Unspecified Anemias and Blood Disease                 0.0153  0.8451 
Drug/Alcohol Abuse, Without Dependence                     -0.2808  0.0260 
Personality  Disorders                  -0.0245  0.6385 
Depression                   -0.2018  0.1410 
Anxiety  Disorders                  0.0535  0.3028 
Other Psychiatric Disorders                       0.0568  0.3619 
Other  Developmental  Disability                -0.0285  0.9328 
Seizure Disorders and Convulsions                       0.0954  0.4691 
Mononeuropathy, Other Neurological Conditions/Injuries                   -0.0202  0.6221 
Unstable Angina and Other Acute Ischemic Heart Disease                   0.1567  0.1554 
Angina Pectoris/Old Myocardial Infarction                     -0.3926  <.0001 
Hypertensive Heart Disease                       0.1023  0.0028 
Other and Unspecified Heart Disease                 0.2389  0.4404 
Cerebrovascular Disease, Unspecified                -0.0361  0.5738 
Vascular  Disease                  0.0393  0.6597 
Other  Circulatory  Disease                0.0382  0.4691 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease                     -0.1379  0.2430 
Asthma                   0.0375  0.2970 




Appendix Table A1 Insurance probits – Various specifications, details continued 
          Model  VII 
Variable                Coeff  p-value 
Glaucoma                                      -0.0146  0.8728 
Cataract                  0.0853  0.1893 
Other  Eye  Disorders                 0.1309  <.0001 
Significant Ear, Nose, and Throat Disorders                     0.4260  0.0295 
Hearing  Loss                  0.0318  0.3231 
Other Ear, Nose, Throat, and Mouth Disorders                     0.0414  0.0857 
Urinary Obstruction and Retention                       0.0527  0.4253 
Incontinence                  0.2248  0.0107 
Other Urinary Tract Disorders                       -0.0244  0.7744 
Male  Genital  Disorders                 0.0338  0.8689 
Other  Dermatological  Disorders                0.0800  0.1626 
Other  Injuries                  0.0354  0.4516 
Major Symptoms, Abnormalities                       0.2095  0.1850 
Minor Symptoms, Signs, Findings                                0.0569  0.0912 
                  
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII 
Observations 17694  17694  17694  17694  17694  17694  17694 
Log Lkhd  -12036.4  -11253.4  -9785.5 -9585.2 -9459.3  -9440.7  -9397.4 
No pars.  5  25  50  74  84  89  130 
Pseudo-R
2 0.0162  0.0802  0.2001  0.2165  0.2268  0.2283  0.2318 
 